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WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FoR? By John H. Garvey. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1996. Pp. viii, 312. $35. 
In 1988, Jeffrey Kendall and Barbara Zeitler Kendall were mar­
ried.1 Though Jeffrey was Catholic at the time and Barbara was 
Jewish, the couple agreed to raise their children in Barbara's faith. 
In 1991, Jeffrey joined Boston Church of Christ, a fundamentalist 
Christian church. The tenets of that faith include a belief that those 
who do not accept Jesus Christ are damned to Hell, where there 
will be "weeping and gnashing of teeth." Barbara's faith also un­
derwent a change during the marriage: she became an Orthodox 
Jew. Citing irreconcilable differences, the Kendalls sought a di­
vorce in November, 1994. 
Before their marriage dissolved, the Kendalls had three chil­
dren, all of whom were under ten at the time of the divorce. In the 
divorce petition, Barbara sought to restrict Jeffrey's ability to ex­
pose the children to his fundamentalist faith. The probate court 
was then faced with a choice: it could deny this aspect of Barbara's 
petition or it could order such a restriction and thereby appear to 
endorse one religion over the other. Reasoning that it was acting in 
the best interests of the children, the divorce court prohibited Jef­
frey from taking his children to church, exposing them to Bible 
study, or otherwise expressing to them his religious views, if such 
activities alienated the children from their Jewish self-identity or 
from their mother, or if the activities caused the children emotional 
harm. Though it had no evidence that any present harm had come 
to the children, the court nevertheless found that the likelihood of 
future substantial psychological harm was sufficient to justify the 
restriction. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld 
the order. 
Reflecting the increasing number of interfaith marriages2 - and 
subsequent interfaith divorces that potentially put courts in the po­
sition of deciding between allegedly irreconcilable but abstractly 
"good" religious practices - the Kendall case provides fertile 
ground for examining John H. Garvey's new study of constitutional 
freedom, What Are Freedoms For? In most of this book, Garvey 
aims to debunk the most common conception of freedoms: that 
they are "rights to make choices" (p. 1). In philosophical terms, 
this conception is expressed by the phrase "the right is prior to the 
1. All the following facts are related in Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 & nn.4-
7 (Mass. 1997). 
2. See Robert Marquand, Kids' Choice of Religion in Divorce, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Dec. 12, 1997, at 1, 9 (reporting that more than 50% of Buddhists and Jews, 40% of Muslims, 
and 30 to 40% of Catholics marry outside their faith). 
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good," where the right in question is the right to make a choice (p. 
1). Under this approach, the Constitution's guarantees of freedom 
are intended to permit each person to decide for himself what is the 
good and how to achieve it. 
In opposition to this conception of freedom, Garvey argues that 
the good is prior to the right. He envisions freedom "as a right to 
act [in particular ways], not a right to choose" (p. 2). He thus dis­
tinguishes autonomy from freedom. He also believes that some ac­
tions are better than others, and that the Constitution gives 
freedom to perform such actions without government interference 
because they are better. 
Garvey recognizes the difficult task he has set for himself: he 
acknowledges that the first view of freedom has become orthodox. 
His strategy therefore is patient and meticulous. In chapter after 
chapter, he acknowledges the now-conventional view, often admit­
ting its prima fade merits. He then offers his competing concep­
tion, attempting to demonstrate that it is a superior explanation of 
the law of constitutional freedoms. 
Using Kendall v. Kendall.3 - a case in which two religions came 
into conflict - as a foil, this Notice examines Garvey's theory of 
freedom particularly as it relates to religion.4 Part I sets forth Gar­
vey's general argument in regard to freedom of religion. Part II 
describes Garvey's views on the freedom children achieve through 
their representatives. Part III analyzes Kendall on Garvey's terms 
and concludes that while Garvey's theory does have some explana­
tory power, it may not perfectly capture the dynamic at stake in 
cases like Kendall. ' 
I. FREEDOM 
Garvey largely rejects the idea that constitutional freedom has 
the purpose of allowing choice, or a zone of autonomy.5 Because 
"autonomy is a moral ideal, [and] freedom is a legal rule" (p. 6), 
Garvey concedes that freedom might conceivably be a way of set­
ting up the legal rules to ensure autonomy. Such a concept of free-
3. 687 N.E.2d 1228. 
4. Garvey does not confine his discussion to religion. He also focuses on freedom of 
association and freedom of speech. 
5. P. 12. Garvey notes two arguments that posit choice as the ultimate value. Tue auton­
omy theory holds that "each person is an end in himself, a kind of sovereign over a kingdom 
of one." P. 23. Following others' orders, as opposed to making one's own choices, would 
violate this sovereignty. In contrast, the political theory stresses the idea that people disagree 
irreconcilably "about whether some forms of life are better than others." To achieve demo­
cratic stability of government such questions are removed from the lawmakers' table and left 
to the choice of individuals. P. 23. Garvey cites no sources for these views and the reader 
suspects immediately that perhaps, even under these views, choice is valued only in a limited 
subset of cases and not in a sweeping range of cases. 
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dom, however, would need to be extremely broad6 and both 
bilateral and universal in character.7 Without such a broad concep­
tion of freedom, autonomy would not be possible, because it would 
be impossible to achieve unanimous and voluntary consent to the 
legal rules. If choice or autonomy were the ultimate value, dissent 
would arise from legal rules informed by a narrower conception of 
freedom because these rules would protect some choices but not 
others. 
Garvey points out that we do not have such a broad conception 
of freedom. Freedom is particular and not universal (p. 12). The 
Constitution protects only certain kinds of freedom. "[T]he law 
does not give us any special freedom to hunt, fish, drink whiskey, 
shoot pool, or work for Toyota" (p. 13). 
Freedom is also not necessarily bilateral. Not every act has an 
opposing act that people might choose (p. 17). Reproductive free­
dom8 might include the right to abortion and the right to childbear­
ing. But it might not. Abortion, Garvey points out, might also not 
be considered a reproductive choice at all, but rather its antithesis. 
Thus, a right to childbearing would not necessarily entail a right to 
an abortion (p. 18). Similarly, a right to religion does not entail a 
right to atheism (p. 40). Each action requires its own justification. 
Freedoms do not come in pairs a priori; they must be paired (p. 39). 
Because our concept of freedom is so limited, autonomy cannot 
be its sole purpose. Instead, Garvey argues, freedom's purpose is to 
protect particular ways of acting that we deem good: "[F]reedoms 
allow us to engage in certain kinds of actions that are particularly 
valuable. The law leaves us free to do x because it is a good thing to 
do x" (p. 19). 
Garvey uses freedom of religion to illustrate his point about the 
purpose of freedom. He contrasts two approaches to religious free­
dom, the Agnostic Viewpoint and the Believer's Viewpoint. The for­
mer posits autonomy as the underlying purpose of freedom of 
religion (pp. 42-49). Under this view, religious decisions are one 
way - but only one way - in which we shape our lives and express 
our individual humanity and identity. For this purpose, the truth 
6. The view that autonomy requires a very broad conception of freedom may be no more 
than a straw man. On the other hand, the argument Garvey espouses is not limited to how 
widely one defines the type of choice freedom permits. In such a dispute, the relevant issue is 
what counts as a choice about religion, or a choice about reproduction. Garvey will deny that 
"choice" is an improper term to describe those particularly valued activities in which people 
engage. 
7. It would need to be bilateral in the sense that freedom to act in a particular way would 
necessarily entail freedom to act in the opposite way. It would need to be universal in the 
sense of being sufficiently applicable to a wide number of activities so as to provide an equal 
measure of freedom for all the various actions a citizen might think important. 
8. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (recognizing marriage 
and procreation as fundamental rights). 
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and value of particular religious decisions are unimportant. Partic­
ular outcomes are unimportant. The value lies in the choice. For 
this reason, one religious choice is accepting God. Choosing to re­
ject Him, however, is as good a choice as acceptance. 
Garvey rejects the Agnostic Viewpoint on several grounds, in­
cluding the mistaken conception of personhood that it assumes (p. 
44), its inconsistency with the experience of believers (p. 46), and its 
inconsistency with existing legal doctrine.9 First, the Agnostic 
Viewpoint posits an essential self unburdened by "habitual convic­
tions and desires" (p. 44). This self can examine its convictions and 
desires, rejecting those that conflict with the selfs idea of what life 
should be like and accepting those that are congruent. Garvey 
questions both whether this examination is possible and whether it 
is desirable.10 Second, the viewpoint does not match the experience 
of many believers. They do not experience belief as a choice: 
"[F]aith is a gift" (p. 51). Furthermore, at least some would contest 
the definition of freedom: "[I]t is accurate to say that Christian 
freedom consists not in making our own [value] choices but in 
obeying the law of God" (p. 46). The believer does not cherish his 
freedom because it allows him to make value choices, but rather 
because it permits him to obey God. Lastly, Garvey points out that 
the viewpoint does not match existing legal doctrine.11 While be­
lievers and nonbelievers are sometimes accorded equal protection, 
this is not always true.12 In some cases, believers get special 
protection. 
Garvey's alternative to the Agnostic Viewpoint is the Believer's 
Viewpoint. The value underlying freedom of religion here is the 
shared moral belief that religion and the acts associated with it are 
good things (p. 49). Freedom permits a person to achieve these 
goods and to do these good acts without governmental interference. 
Presumably, by contrast, the government could freely interfere with 
the vast range of activities constituting nonbelief and nonreligion. 
9. He also questions whether the choice to reject God is appropriately characterized as 
an act "of religion" protected by the First Amendment's text. P. 43. 
10. This vision of humanity is entirely at odds, for one example, with the Christian no­
tions of grace and of original sin, the "inability to master sinful desires and to freely will 
doing good." P. 45. 
11. As a general matter, Garvey's analysis is somewhat slippery. When current constitu­
tional law matches Garvey's theory, he cites it to prove his theory is right, by which he means 
it has more explanatory power. Other times he notes the divergence-of the Supreme Court 
decisions and his theory, yet still argues that he is right. It is not clear in such cases what he 
means by right. Perhaps Garvey "take[s] seriously . . .  the possibility that there are right 
answers to political-moral problems. " MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CoNSTITUTION, THE CoURTS, 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 102 (1982). 
12. Garvey points out, for example, that the law still protects religions from discrimina­
tion and exempts religions from certain obligations solely because they are religions. Pp. 54, 
192-93. 
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The Believer's Viewpoint also recognizes that religion, as a gen­
eral matter, requires freedom (pp. 50-54). One. cannot, after all, 
coerce faith, and interference with the acquisition and dissemina­
tion of religious knowledge would inhibit the search for truth. 
From the perspective of the individual believer, religion also re­
quires freedom because it is particularly cruel for a government to 
subject a person to dire otherworldly spiritual consequences by in­
terfering with religious practice (p. 52) and because it is offensive to 
God to do so (p. 53). 
Garvey acknowledges that only some people will find such rea­
sons convincing and that these people will tend to be believers (p. 
54). He has several answers to this charge. First, he notes that eve­
rybody - believers and nonbelievers alike - benefits from free­
dom from coercion and from noninterference with truth-seeking. 
The government may not prevent believers from engaging in their 
religious observances, but it may not compel an agnostic to partici­
pate in any such observances either (p. 53). Second, Garvey reiter­
ates his criticism that the Agnostic Viewpoint is no more neutral 
than the Believer's Viewpoint, because it, too, rests on assumptions 
that only some people can accept.13 Finally, he argues that the Be­
liever's Viewpoint has more explanatory power. The Agnostic 
Viewpoint offers no reasons why autonomy with regard to religion 
is protected but autonomy with regard to cigarette smoking is not 
(pp. 45, 49). The Believer's Viewpoint at least can answer this 
question. 
JI. CHILDREN, REPRESENTATIVES, AND FREEDOM 
In his discussion of children and freedom, Garvey starts with the 
observation that "[t]he constitutional rules about freedoms don't 
work well for [children and others who are legally incompetent]" 
(p. 82). Garvey rejects in part one explanation for this phenome­
non - a utilitarian view that the consequences of freedom are 
more grave for children (p. 82). Instead, Garvey argues that chil­
dren's limited ability to engage in practical reasoning is a better ex­
planation (p. 82). Thus, "[ o ]ur moral intuitions suggest that a 
child's freedom is less important than an adult's, not just that it is 
more often outweighed" by grave consequences.14 
His proof that we value adults' freedom differently lies in the 
way we balance, in particular cases, freedom and the adverse conse-
13. P. 56; see supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text {describing notions of personhood 
and the experience of belief that the Agnostic Viewpoint entails). 
14. Pp. 84-85. Garvey has a disconcerting habit of making declarations of what "our" 
intuitions are and are not. See, e.g., p. 27 {discussing "our intuitions about random sexual 
conduct"). The title of one review of What Are Freedoms For? seems to question how widely 
shared some of Garvey's declared .intuitions are. See Alan E. Brownstein, The Freedom Not 
to Be John Garvey, 83 CoRNELL L. REv. 767 {1998). 
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quences flowing from keeping an activity free from governmental 
interference. In the case of adults, two principles guide this balanc­
ing: the harm principle and the least-restrictive-alternative rule. 
The harm principle sets a maximum threshold of harms that we are 
willing to tolerate as a consequence of the exercise of freedom. The 
constitutional requirement that the government show a "compelling 
state interest" embodies this principle: the state has a compelling 
interest in preventing only those harms above the threshold and so 
may restrict the freedom that gives rise to these harms' occur­
rence.15 The least-restrictive-alternative rule "holds that even when 
an activity causes significant harm the government must be careful 
not to overregulate" (p. 85). Children's freedom is shown to be 
different not because the principles used to balance are different, 
but because we tolerate fewer harms and permit more restrictions 
on children.16 The freedom that children enjoy is thus less expan­
sive than adults' freedom - and obviously much less expansive 
than that which autonomy requires. 
The reason for the lower value placed on children's freedom has 
its root, according to Garvey, in responsibility. Drawing on the 
criminal law, Garvey argues that the law generally respects the abil­
ity to choose by pu¢shillg only those capable of conforming their 
actions to the dictates of the law.17 Garvey does not, however, deny 
children's ability to choose. Rather, he says "[w]e are inclined to 
say about children that though they can make choices, they are not 
very good at choosing; they habitually choose the wrong things" (p. 
91). Therefore, he goes on to say, "we excuse children not because 
they can't choose but because they can't make the right choices" (p. 
91), and "[t]hose who are too young or too disordered to under­
stand the difference between good and bad have no need of free­
dom. "18 Why? Because freedom, to recall, "is valuable because it 
allows us to do good things" (p. 95). 
15. Pp. 276-77 nn.12-13 (citing cases). 
16. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) ("The state's authority 
over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults."). 
17. The law respects choice by punishing the wrong choices. Garvey acknowledges the 
counterintuitive nature of this claim, but he does not make what appears to be an obvious 
connection to a Christian's finding freedom in obeying God. See supra text accompanying 
note 11. 
18. P. 95. Thus, in the case of freedom of speech, Garvey is willing to suppress some 
points of view for children, because doing so helps "to make sure children can recognize the 
good, the true, and the beautiful." P. 104. Children have representatives precisely to make 
good choices for them. For this reason, Garvey would no doubt reject the Kendall court's 
reliance on the children's identifying themselves as Jewish and in one instance "choosing" to 
study Orthodox Judaism. Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (Mass. 1997). These 
factors are not terribly relevant: the fact that the children have chosen an objective good -
religion - does not mean that they consistently can choose the good. That is why their 
representatives make all the choices for them and this scenario renders the children free. 
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To overcome his inability to make the right choices, a child must 
achieve freed0m through a representative who can make such 
choices. Thus, "[t]he real question [becomes] who his representa­
tive should be - parents or the state" (p. 117). Parent representa­
tives are superior to government representatives because their ties 
to the child, the likelihood that the child's interests overlap with the 
parents', and the absence of objective standards to guide a govern­
mental decisionmaker all point to a kind of functional consent be­
tween parent and child that does not exist with the government.19 
Government intervention, on the other hand, may succeed in 
mak[ing] children more free vis-a-vis their parents, [but it] makes chil­
dren less free in their relations with the state. If a child is in danger of 
being overwhelmed by his parents' Islam, exposing him to Sunday 
School and pork chops might assist his choice of a religion when he 
comes of age. But the purpose of the Constitution's guarantee of reli­
gious liberty is to protect people from the government, not [from] 
their relatives . 
. . . The Constitution requires, as a general rule, that the govern-
ment withdraw from these cases. [p. 122] 
Garvey claims that children have freedom "in the constitutional 
sense when relatives or friends act for them," but they are not free 
when governmental agencies or judges act for them (p. 113). 
Accordingly, Garvey disapproves of the dominant model that 
permits courts to review choices of the child's representative under 
a purportedly objective standard like best interests of the child. He 
finds a subjective model more consistent with the Constitution. 
Under this model, the family representative defines what is good 
for the child according to the representative's own standards (p. 
117). This model is particularly attractive when applied to decisions 
about which there are no objective standards, such as matters in­
volving the child's education or religious upbringing.20 
III. GARVEY AND Kendall 
This Part applies Garvey's theory to some of the questions 
raised by Kendall v. Kendall. Section III.A resolves a threshold is­
sue by acknowledging that the ruling is in fact a constraint that in­
volves the First Amendment. Section III.B argues that at first 
glance Garvey's theory requires the government to withdraw, but 
19. Garvey says the proper metaphor is a republic where people are considered self­
governing because they elect the representatives who do the governing. Parents are 
"elected" by virtue of their ties to the child. P. 119. 
20. Garvey contrasts such decisions with decisions about health care issues. For the lat­
ter, the objective model is somewhat more palatable "because there are certain primary 
goods (life, health, the absence of pain) that any rational person would want. " P. 116. Nev­
ertheless, even if he concedes that these goods are primary, Garvey explains that some peo­
ple value other things as well, some more highly than the identified primary goods. For this 
reason, he prefers the subjective approach. P. 116. 
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points to elements in Garvey's thinking that undermine such a hasty 
conclusion. It concludes that Garvey's simple dichotomy of Agnos­
tic and Believer's Viewpoints does not fully capture what is at stake 
in Kendall. 
A. Constraints 
In the second part of-his book,21 which is considerably more dis­
cursive than the first, Garvey constructs a taxonomy of government 
constraints. He makes the point that what counts as a constraint 
ought to be a critical threshold issue (p. 166). Only constraints and 
not other measures need to be justified by compelling state 
interests. 
With regard to this threshold issue, the Kendall court forbade 
Jeffrey to expose his children to his religious beliefs because the 
court believed its order to be in the best interests of the children. 
In doing so, the court admitted that it constrained Jeffrey's free­
dom,22 though its admission was not without reservation.23 Even 
had the court not characterized its order as a constraint, Garvey's 
theory provides two reasons for thinking that it is.24 First, any bur­
den on Jeffrey in his role as representative is therefore a burden on 
the rights of his three children to free exercise - at least of Jeffrey's 
religion.25 To recall, a child is free in the constitutional sense when 
21. The second half of Garvey's book tackles the other side of the freedom coin. His 
argument on this score is lengthy and complex and not particularly relevant to the Kendall 
case, so this Notice will leave it to the reader. Suffice it to say, because Garvey argues that 
freedom has a moral aspect in that it gives us freedom to do good acts, he recognizes a flip 
side: that a government that interferes with freedom is doing not simply an amoral, but a 
positively bad act. P. 2. 
22. See Kendall, 687 N.E.2d at 1235 (noting that constraint is permissible if justified by a 
compelling government interest). The court was somewhat schizophrenic, however, because 
it conflated the existence of a constraint with whether it ts justified. See, e.g., Kendall, 687 
N.E.2d at 1236 (explaining that the restriction is not a constraint because it is for a secular 
purpose, a logical non sequitur). Later the court denied both that it had burdened the prac­
tice of religion and that it had "established Judaism" as the children's religion as forbidden by 
the Frrst Amendment. Kendal� 687 N.E.2d at 1236. If it had not constrained the practice of 
religion, it would not have needed to mention - much less show - that there was a compel­
ling government interest, the best interest of the Kendall children. Thus, it is safe to conclude 
that the court believed it had burdened the practice of religio�, but that the burden was 
justified. · 
. 
23. The court hedged by stating that, technically, it had not burdened Jeffrey's exercise ·at 
all. He remained free to pray and follow whatever religious observances he wished. To the 
extent religious observances include proselytizing and other evangelical work, the court's 
conclusion seems plainly mistaken. 
24. It is unclear from the Kendall decision which parent had legal custody or whether the 
custody was joint. The matter, however, is not strictly important to this analysis. The selec­
tion of one parent over the other as the child's representative, if done in part because the 
chosen parent's religion is ostensibly the same as the expresse.d religion of the children, 
would amount in effect to the same type of restriction the court in fact imposed in this case. 
25. The Supreme Court's decisions, while not unequivocal, appear to support Garvey's 
point. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) (distinguishing be­
tween regulation of religion qua religion and generally applicable rules and holding that only 
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his representative is free to make choices for the child in what the 
representative believes to be the child's best interest. 
Second, to Garvey, the essence of constraint is intention.26 He 
distinguishes among three types of intention; in Garvey's taxonomy, 
laws of the first two kinds are constraints: 
1. In the easiest case . . .  the government forbids people to do x 
because it thinks that x is bad . . .. 
2. More typical is the case where the government forbids x as a 
means to some other end . . . . The government not only foresees that 
x will be abridged, but actually tries to bring that about [even though] 
[i]t might do so with genuine regret. ... 
3 . . . .  [T]he impact on x [may be] only a side effect, not a means. 
[pp. 21 2-1 3] 
Kendall represents the second type. The court forbade the practice 
of religion qua religion to produce its desired end. It did not, for 
example, prohibit nonreligious denigration of Barbara. Instead, it 
singled out religion - an ironic, backhanded recognition of what 
Garvey believes, that religion is "special" (p. 45). The court's order 
was, therefore, a constraint on free exercise and needed to be justi­
fied by a compelling state interest.27 
B. Justifications 
According to Garvey, freedom gives us the space in which to do 
good acts. Exercise of religion is one such intrinsically good act. 
Freedom is the legal rule that gives people the opportunity to pur­
sue this good. As a general rule, government ought to withdraw 
from situations involving religious decisionmaking for children in 
favor of decisionmaking by representatives.28 At first glance, the 
Kendall court appears to have fl.outed the general rule. 
the latter are not constraints). The Kendall court burdens religion qua religion. While it 
purports to be acting in the child's best interest, it regulates only exposure to religion and not 
exposure to other behaviors that might also lead to distress. See Kendall, 687 N.E.2d at 1231. 
Furthermore, Smith explicitly retains the old test from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 
402-03 {1963) (requiring that governmental actions that substantially burden a religious prac­
tice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest) for "individualized decisions" 
- which the best-interest-of-the-child test assuredly is. Finally, Smith notes the Court's par­
ticular solicitude for "hybrid situations" in which, as in Kendall, the law in question burdens 
both the freedom of religion and another right, such as a parent's right to control his child's 
schooling or upbringing. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citing, inter alia, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972)). 
26. Pp. 216-17 ("Bad intentions have an intrinsic significance; they are part of what it 
means to violate the Constitution."). This conclusion follows from his argument that the 
government has a duty not to interfere, not simply a lack of power to interfere. See supra 
note 22. 
27. This conclusion is true regardless of the government's purported interest; that interest 
could justify the constraint, but it could not make it any less of a constraint. 
28. P. 122. Indeed, his argument is stronger: the government has a moral duty to with­
draw. See supra notes 22, 25. 
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Nevertheless, four concepts more or less implicit in Garvey's 
thinking might seem to support the court's decision. Although in 
the end, Garvey's theory generally upholds application of the gen­
eral rule in a case like Kendall, it is worth considering the four con­
cepts, which follow. First, it may make sense to argue that there is 
no equivalence between a religion that says others will burn in Hell 
and a religion that does not do ·so. The secular worship of tolerance 
appears to prohibit equating the two. Second, Garvey's solicitude 
for representatives suggests that the government ought also to have 
respected the wishes of Barbara. Withdrawing from the decision 
was not neutral in this sense; it showed disrespect for Barbara's 
freedom. Third, because the freedom at stake in Kendall may be 
characterized as the child's and not the parent's freedom,29 Gar­
vey's conclusion that children have less freedom may make the 
court's intervention more palatable constitutionally. Fourth, ac­
knowledging that religion is a good does not necessarily mean that 
more religion is better, or even also good. Indeed, Garvey makes 
much of rejecting choice. The following paragraphs in tum describe 
how Garvey's theory ultimately rejects three of these four reasons 
despite their facial plausibility, and proves inconclusive in answer­
ing the fourth. 
Evaluating Religions. The modem ethic of tolerance might call 
for courts to decide that a tolerant religion should be favored over 
an intolerant one. While the court did not, of course, announce 
that it had made an evaluation of the Kendall parents' respective 
religions on this basis,30 the district court's findings nonetheless in­
cluded numerous references to the belief of Jeffrey's church that 
nonbelievers will burn in Hell, that there will be "weeping and 
gnashing of teeth," and that Jeffrey Kendall vowed never to stop 
trying to get his children to accept Jesus Christ. Despite the fact 
that the probate court found that "leav[ing] each parent free to ex­
pose the children . . . to his or her religion"31 would substantially 
damage the children, it detailed no written findings on Barbara's 
faith and did not refer to its tenets, despite the fact that Barbara's 
faith, too, had shifted, from Reform to Orthodox Judaism. It seems 
possible that Barbara's religion may also have tenets that implicitly 
or explicitly denigrate the father. The whole concept of the Chosen 
People, for example, conceivably denigrates Jeffrey as "unchosen." 
The court did not examine this issue, and this lack of reflection em­
bodies the fears of Garvey and those who think like him: "[This 
decision] is also an invitation for judges to do what the Constitution 
29. See Kendall, 687 N.E.2d at 1234 (so characterizing the issue). 
30. See Kendal� 687 N.E.2d at 1236 (claiming that the restriction's focus is on the physical 
and emotional well-being of the child, not on the merits of the parents' respective religions). 
31. See Kendal� 687 N.E.2d at 1231 (emphasis added). 
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doesn't want them to do - discriminate on the basis of the content 
of religion."32 Thus despite one's temptation to evaluate on the ba­
sis of tolerance, Garvey rejects government evaluation of religious 
truth claims. By this measure, at least, Kendall is not a special case 
and Garvey would apply the general rule of governmental 
noninterference. 
Protecting Barbara. Barbara is as much the representative of 
her children as Jeffrey is. The children's freedom, therefore, ac­
cording to Garvey's model, also lies in Barbara's freedom to do for 
them what she thinks best. Inaction by the court, then, would not 
have been a neutral stance at all, but rather a loaded one that would 
have failed to protect Barbara's freedom - and by extension the 
children's. Alternatively, governmental action might have been 
necessary to prevent a situation in which neither representative 
could exercise the children's freedom effectively because of the 
other's interference. 
In contexts unrelated to the Kendall case, Garvey recognizes the 
strength of this argument.33 This recognition suggests at first that 
application of his theory to Kendall might lead to the conclusion 
that there is no neutral stance consistent with freedom. Govern­
ment inaction would not have been neutral from Barbara's perspec­
tive. The court's order was not neutral, because although it 
purported to use a neutral standard, the best interest of the child, 
this standard presumes an Agnostic Viewpoint.34 A radically neu­
tral outcome, in which neither parent may expose the children to 
his or her religion, or in which the court orders the children ex­
posed to a third religion - say, Buddhism - is also radically un­
free, like · living, Garvey says, under an "evenhanded despot" (p. 
190). 
Garvey's theory would not accept this suggestion. While he 
would recognize that from Barbara's perspective government inac­
tion was not neutral, he would deny that it was constitutionally un­
free. The Constitution, he points out in other contexts, regulates 
32. Marquand, supra note 2, at 9 (quoting University of Michigan Law School Professor 
Carl Schneider) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
33. In a discussion of free speech, for example, Garvey notes that, to the speaker, it 
makes no difference whether it is the government or a private actor that burdens speech. He 
therefore makes a plausible straw-man argument that the Constitution might require that the 
government step in to protect speakers from content-based restraints on speech by private 
actors-actors like Jeffrey Kendall. P. 246. Garvey calls this theory the "public interest" 
theory of the public function argument. Pp. 247-48. He attributes the theory to the now­
overruled Supreme Court decision in Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 
391 U.S. 308 {1968), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 {1976). Garvey subse­
quently demolishes this superficially attractive straw man. Pp. 251-59. 
34. Commentators have pointed out that the standard is not neutral in practice. See gen­
erally Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. Cm. L. 
REv. 1 {1987). 
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freedom as against the state; it does not protect private citizens 
from other citizens and so does not protect Barbara from her ex­
husband's persuasions. The government's moral duty is noninter­
ference. This duty does not extend to preventing nongovernmental 
interferences. Protecting Barbara's freedom also does not make 
Kendall a special case under Garvey's theory. 
The Freedom of Children. Another reason that suggests Kendall 
may not be an easy case under Garvey's theory is his belief that we 
do not value children's freedom as much as adults'. Because it is 
the children's and not the parents' free exercise that the court pur­
ported to impair, the court was neither bound by the least­
restrictive-means test nor required to adhere to as high a harm 
threshold as it would have were an adult's more valuable freedom 
at stake. The court needed less reason to impose a constraint on a 
child's freedom.35 
In a general sense, Garvey grants this possibility. He acknowl­
edges that there are relatives who do not make good representa­
tives and whose choices for the children could be "callous, selfish, 
or downright evil."36 In such cases, "there is a compelling state in­
terest in overriding" the child's - and the representative's - claim 
to freedom.37 Indeed, in Kendall, there are a number of intuitively 
appealing reasons for thinking that the court got it right: the chil­
dren's expressed religious preference, the father's unwillingness to 
keep to his premarriage bargain,38 the suspicion that the father was 
using his children against the mother, and the perverse and outra­
geous behavior of shaving off his son's payes. 39 This view of the 
freedom at stake may indeed make Kendall a special case. In fact, 
it suggests that Kendall is an easy case the other way: the child's 
best interest trumps the child's freedom claim, a claim that has less 
value than an adult's freedom claim. If the general rule is noninter­
ference, here interference might have been more appropriate. 
35. The constraint here is not the order, per se, but the substitution of the government for 
the parents as the children's representative. See p. 118 ("[W]hen the government steps into 
R's shoes . . .  X is not free"). 
36. P. 122. It is not clear what standard Garvey uses to measure callousness, selfishness, 
and evil, however, since he had earlier thrown out any objective measure. See supra notes 
19-20 and accompanying text. It would seem that any inquiry into a representative's motives 
along these measures would be a back door into precisely the type of governmental interfer­
ence Garvey does not like. It should be noted, however, that because freedom is not univer­
sal for Garvey, this back door is permissible in areas that are unfree. In religious choices, 
Garvey might argue, the back door is not open. 
37. P. 122. But in such cases, Garvey adds, the child "though better off, is not free." P. 
122. 
38. Indeed, making a kind of estoppel argument, the court somewhat illogically cited 
these two reasons as proof that its decision did not amount to a preference. See Kendall v. 
Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (Mass. 1997). 
39. Payes are earlocks worn for religious reasons. 
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Two considerations make accepting this view problematic. First, 
it glosses over the preliminary question of whose freedom is at 
stake, the child's or the representative's. Second, while Garvey 
leaves open the general possibility that representatives might be cal­
lous, selfish, or evil, and that the government might be permitted to 
inquire into such motives, he does not specifically allow such an 
inquiry into the motives behind religious decisionmaking. Indeed, 
because in his view freedom is particular and not universal, Garvey 
may permit such governmental inquiries in nonreligious decision­
making, but not as to religious action.40 It is therefore unclear 
whether Garvey's theory would discard the general rule of govern­
mental noninterference on this basis. 
Choice. Garvey's rejection of the primacy of choice is a final 
plausible reason for believing that Kendall might be an exception to 
the general rule. Governmental noninterference in this case would 
provide the children with a choice between religions. For Garvey, 
however, the fact that exposure to religion is a good act does not 
entail the corollary that exposure to more religions is better.41 For 
this reason, it is at least arguable that Garvey would not recognize 
the value in exposure to two very different faiths and would there­
fore endorse the court's order. 
Admittedly, this argument is not terribly strong and probably 
would not permit escape from the general rule of governmental 
noninterference under Garvey's theory. The argument provides no 
rule, for example, for deciding which faith gets the governmental 
stamp of approval. Empirically speaking, too, it is at least open to 
question in what sense a child's simultaneous exposure to two reli­
gions detracts from his practice of either. 
In any case, the real utility of the argument comes in helping to 
illustrate that views about freedom do not resolve themselves 
neatly into the poles of the Agnostic and Believer's Viewpoints. 
Consider two points. First, in a perverse sense, the court gives reli­
gion the special place that Garvey desires. After all, the probate 
court judge found "directly contradictory messages from trusted 
adults to be solidly contrary to [the children's] best interests," yet 
her order prohibited only contradictory religious messages.42 If the 
court subscribed to the Agnostic Viewpoint, it would have treated 
religion as merely one choice among many that are integral in con­
stituting the human. Furthermore, the opinion reveals that the 
court did not make a god out of choice as an adherent of the Ag-
40. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9. 
41. Cf. p. 122 (discussing the absurdity of exposing the child of Muslim parents to "Sun· 
day School and pork chops" to ensure his religious freedom). 
42. Kendal� 687 N.E.2d at 1235 (quoting probate court's findings of fact) (internal quota­
tion marks omitted). 
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nostic Viewpoint would. Indeed, it is by denying choice that the 
court hoped to accomplish its end of safeguarding identity. In this 
sense, it is not autonomy that informs what it is to be human, but 
state-enforced acceptance of one group identity over another. 
These two points - regarding autonomy and the special place 
of religion - suggest three Viewpoints, not two. Massachusetts 
precedent prior to Kendall seems to match the Agnostic Viewpoint. 
The precedent held that exposing children to the separate faiths of 
divorced parents was a healthy thing.43 It assumed that autonomy 
and choice are the purposes of freedom, and its "metatheory of 
goodness" was to maximize the possibilities open to children when 
they were able and allowed to choose (p. 117). Such choices were 
deemed to be good because autonomy builds or is expressive of 
identity. For this reason, Massachusetts courts did not interfere in 
decisions regarding children's religious upbringing in the context of 
divorce. Garvey, on the other hand, advocates the Believer's View­
point. He contends that exposing children to parental religion is a 
good act, that freedom protects this good act, and that courts have a 
duty not to interfere. The Kendall court by contrast reflected 
neither of these views. The court allowed that freedom may consist 
of choice - though not because autonomy builds identity. Indeed, 
autonomy was found to be a threat to the children's "Jewish self­
identity." The court further allowed that freedom may mean non­
interference, but not because exposing children to parental religion 
is intrinsically good. Rather, the court found religion only instru­
mentally good. Thus, the court's viewpoint ultimately is not about 
freedom; it is about choosing beneficial psychological - and pur­
portedly neutral - outcomes.44 
CONCLUSION 
This last viewpoint, the one actually taken by the Kendall court, 
is the one Garvey might have found most objectionable had he con­
sidered it. The yardstick - the best-interest-of-the-child standard 
- is the problem.45 For all its appearance of neutrality, the court's 
evaluation was not neutral, because it assumed the supremacy of a 
43. See Kendal� 6'07 N.E.2d at 1235 ("[T]he law sees a value in 'frequent and continuing 
contact' of the child with both its parents and thus contact with the parents' separate religious 
preferences.") (quoting Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607 (1981) (citations omitted) 
(quoting In re Marriage of Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 80 (Ct. App. 1980) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting CAL. CIV. CooE § 4600 (West 1979)))). 
44. One might question, among other things, whether it is likely that psychology is able to 
produce more "objective" and less value-laden conclusions about psychological health than 
religion can produce about spiritual health. 
45. For another criticism of this standard, see Elster, supra note 34, at 7 (describing the 
standard as "indeterminate, unjust, self-defeating, and liable to be overridden by more gen­
eral policy considerations"). 
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secular psychological valuation over a religious valuation, the Be­
liever's Viewpoint. Furthermore, the court suggested that freedom 
is good and relevant only insofar as it produces psychologically ac­
ceptable results.46 Under this view, religion is no more than a tool 
to service the child's psychological need. 
Garvey would question this lack of attention to the child's spiri­
tual health. He would question the inherent cruelty of laws contra­
vening religious practices and having consequences in the 
Hereafter.47 He would contend that the government should with­
draw because, as one commentator has said, "a court can't possibly 
decide what is good for a child's religious identity. It has no more 
insight into that question than you and I."48 Finally, he would ask, 
what principled objection could this stance raise to a radical neu­
trality that either prohibits religious instruction altogether or 
chooses a third nonparental religion in which to raise the child? 
Though the dichotomy between Agnostic and Believer's View­
points does not fully explain Kendall, this fact does not entirely 
elude Garvey. Where there is a measure of incompatibility be­
tween religions, a contest of good versus good, one representative's 
religion versus another representative's religion, perhaps freedom, 
whatever its purpose, by necessity gets thrown out the window. 
Perhaps some decision as a practical matter needs to be made be­
cause a child simply cannot effectively practice both representa­
tives' religions simultaneously. As Garvey indicates in a slightly 
different context, it may be true at that point that the Kendall chil­
dren are psychologically better off, but it is important to note that 
- by his standards - they are no longer free. 
- Scott D. Pomfret 
46. Indeed, in this case, in which no harm had yet been visited on the children, the court's 
position is still stronger: freedom is only good and relevant insofar as it creates less risk of 
psychologically unacceptable outcomes. 
47. "To one who believes . . .  the vice of the law is that it requires believers to do a bad 
thing." P. 188. 
48. Marquand, supra note 2, at 9 (quoting University of Michigan Law School Professor 
Carl Schneider) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990) (rejecting the propriety of discerning, and a court's ability to discern, 
what is central to a religion). 
